lisrs ro make sure chat we're nor leaving anything out anti we're
addressi ng all of che requirements char nor just the pa rtner nation military bur also rhe communiry needs. Fifteen years ago, it was nor as
well-programmed, and char's just a martcr of growrh and continuity of
personnel in key positions and experience in rhe program.

THE MILifARY

N K : You wn c jusr calking about adtlrc:~'ing the communil) ncc:d~
how tloc~ rhe commu nity rcacr or how receptive are rhc:y ro the m ilitary co m ing in and cond ucting the de mining ope ra tions?

An Interview With LTC Bob Crowley, U.S. SOUTHCOM

IN MINE ACIION
N icole Kreger (N K ) : \X'har has rhc military comributc:d ro m ine
action over the past 15 years?

LTC Crowley (LTC C): I can on ly calk about wh at we've done in
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Larin America, in the SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command]
AOR [area of responsibiliry], for rhc pasr I 5 years. Even before 15
years ago, before rhere was a U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action [H MA]
Program , which ar the rime was called Demin ing Program, we had
Special Forces folks down in Honduras training the Hondurans how
ro demine. Fi rst of all, the way the program works is the Department
of Scare has rhc lead. They have the final determination on whether
we' re going co have an H MA program with another country or not. So
until that dete rminacion is made, we can' t do any demining training.
Bur when ir is made, what wear SOUTH COM bring ro rhe cable is
techn ical expertise, and we've had acrive demining programs in
Guatemala and El Salvador char are closed down now; c urrent program s are in Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador, Peru and the new one in
Chile.
So what have we done? We
helped the Organization of
American Scates [OAS] establish
MARMIN C A
[Mission
of
Assistance for rhe Removal of
Mines in Central America], which
is an OAS program that relies on
office rs a nd non-commissio ned
officers from throughout Larin
America in the MARM INCA
Center, which is in Manag ua.
We've rrained deminers in all rhc
countries I just mentioned, and in
addition, we've built regional mine
action centers [MACs] in Ecuador
and Peru .
What we do from rhe
De partment of Defense [DoD] side is a Train-the-T rainer program
w irh three components to ic. We'll have a ream of experts that's assembled in rhe United Scares char is comprised of military Special Forces
personnel and sometimes conventional engineers as well. We always
have Civil Affairs personnel and informacion operations specialises char

LTC C: First of all, all of the countries in which we're currently conducting demining operations-Nicaragua, Honduras, Ecuador,
Peru-these are countries chat are used ro having a military presence
because our demining operations and HMA programs started after
their conflicts were over. They have gone from a period of either civil
war or imernational conflict where people are killing each other ro a
period where now the military is coming in and helping them get their
land back. The communities are wonderfully receptive. lr is absolutely unbelievable. We're received wirh open arms by community leaders
and rhe population. We' re rhere to help them solve their problem. The
community relations is a critical componenr of it, and char's whar our
civil affairs personnel work when they're down rhere. I can't chink of
an instance where we've had anything but wonderful reception from
rhe comm unity-from the national level all the way on down ro the
people chat are in a particular community of any size.

go down. The ream will go to the Humanita rian Dem ining Training
Center [HDTC] our at Fort Leonard Wood where they will be trained
co the inrernarional standard as deminers. They need ro have char certification before they're allowed to go anywhere, and once rhey ger
down there, there are rhree components ro rhe program. T he first
componenr is rhc technical advice and assistance in training: how ro
identifY a minefield, how to mark a minefield , how to clear it, how to
remove the mines, working with dogs-the soup co nurs of demining.
Bur manual or even mechanical d emining alone is nor a stand-alone
operation. The two other compo nents are mine risk education-for
example, I mentioned rhe Superman comic books [landminc awareness tools published by DC Comics in cooperation with rhe U.S.
Department of Defense a nd the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF)].
Thar's d1e second aspecr-rhc third aspect is in o rgan izing and running regional mine action centers, which includes rhe database training char we reach as well as rhe comm unity outreach and development
char our civil affairs personnel work on rhc demining missions. And
we're very close co closing out programs in Nicaragua and Honduras.
Ecuador and Peru will rake a little while longer. Ch ile has 273 minefields on rheir northern border area, and chat will rake a few years. Bur
in Southern Command , we are postured ro be rhe firs r regional combatant command char is mine-safe. That's a huge success.

NK: How would you say rhe m ilir.uy approach ro mine acrion i~ diffc renr rro m the hu manitarian sector approach?

LTC C: Thar's a great question. Probably rhe biggest difference is
that we do nor acrually conduce demi ning operations. We rrain the
trainers on how ro conduct demining operations. And char's a policy
d ecision char the United States has made in which our forces are nor
authorized to actually pick up or remove mines. Our m ission is to
trai n rhc partner nation personnel in how ro do char. Now, if you look
at HALO Trust or MAG [the Mines Advisory Group]-a number of
rhc NGOs !non-governmental organizations] go out and rhey actually conduct the demining operations themselves. Our focus really is on
capacity building in the demining area and not the conduct of the
dcmining operations.

NK: H ow would you ~ay the role of rhc milir.1ry in h umanita rian
dem ining ha~ cha nged or develo ped over rhc years?

NK: \XIhcn yo u' re saying char you train rhe trainer\, are you
usually tra in ing the in-counrry milir.t ry?

LTC C: Initially, the program, l wouldn't call it ad hoc, bur it rook
Department of Defense and Southern Co mmand awhile to establish
the relationsh ips that we have with OAS, ro come up wirh rhe exacr
right template of forces that arc needed for a problem . R igh t now,
before any dem in ing mission, we do a comprehensive pre-deployment
sire survey ro identifY exactly whar the ream needs to do when they're
down rhere, and char's done about six months before the m ission.
During that period of ti me, the ream is gai ning the siruarional awareness of rhe mine problem on the ground, what the community needs,
rhe rypc of training rhe partner nation military needs, and is able to go
th rough a very programmatic process and p reparation phase, so that
when they go down, it's not a bunch of guys showing up saying, " Hey,
we know how ro dcm ine. What do you need?" lr's a thought-out, wellorganized, planned and executed procedure wirh a number of check-

LTC C: Yes, we are. And in rhe case of MARMINCA, for example,
MARM INCA again is an OAS organization, but thar's an international group of military personnel . Our focus for the procedures, the actual dcmining operations, yes, we are training the ocher militaries on
how ro demine in rheir own country.
NK: Wh at would yo u say are chc bcndlts or drawbacks o f using m ilita ry forces a~ opposed ro an NCO or a corporate organit<lti on carry ing o ur dcm ining?

rhere as a result of what had been a military problem, and I chink it's
mosr appropriate that the military take care of char problem. I respect
the Dickens out of NGOs char do ir. Ir's a wonderful humanitarian
piece. Bur I would rarher see somebody in uniform risking h is life to
do it because it's a military problem, rather chan seeing an NCO lose
rheir life or limb. And hopefully our train ing is such rhar we won't
have accidents where the dcminers wind up gerring hurt.
NK: Can you give me an example of a success story that yo u know of
of the milit.try in humanitarian demining?

LTC C: The biggest success story we're going to have in the
SOUTHCOM area is coming up. Ecuador and Peru were fighting a
border war in 1994. Following their ceasefire agreement, the United
Narions established rhe United Narions Mission ro Ecuador and Peru
(UNMEP) . Now, there are still tensions in thar area between Ecuador
and Peru . It's been a disputed border; the ccasefire agreemenr reestablished the border. Bur, later on chis year-and we' re looking at rhe
fourth quarter-we're going to be conducting a humanitarian mine
action mission char is nor bilateral in nature. Mosr of them arc-we go
ro country "X" and work wirh chose people. In chis case, we're going
to have deminers from Ecuador and Peru rrain at the Peruvian
Engineer School. We will train them in dcmining tactics, techniques
and procedures. Then we will go up ro the border area, the
Peru/Ecuador border, and those deminers will conduce demining
operations on borh sides of the border. Whar does that mean? That
means Peruvians are going co be dem ining Ecuador and Ecuadorians
are going to be demining Peru. And chen from there, we'll go to
Quito, Ecuador, where we'll conduct some follow-on training. Thar is
a multilateral as opposed ro a bilareral mission. Absolutely a huge success, and we're looking towards fourrh quarter of this year to execute
chat mission.
NK: Do you th ink it i~ important for mine actio n programs to have;
visiting mil itary T echnical Advisors?

LTC C: Ir depends on the capabilities of what they have .... Nor
always. You cake a look ar Honduras and Nicaragua, right now chose
programs are almost complete. There are Nicaraguan deminers right
now in Iraq char were trained by the United Stares military. Now chose
guys are as good as anybody. Do they need us now to cell rhem how
to demine? No. They don't need our assistance at this point. So ir
depends on rhe maturity of the program chat they have in their particular coun try. I expect when we gee down to Chile and starr the program in Chi le in 2005, they've got a very professional army, so our
technical assistance will hopefully be relatively limited and we won'r
have to srarr ar the ground floor with rhe Chileans. So ir depends on
rhe capabilities and rhe particular situation in any given country.
NK: How d o you feel rhe tra in-rhe-rrainers program has helped our
mil itary and host n.uions?

LTC C: One of rhe ancillary benefits we ger from any operation we
LTC C: First of all, l th ink it's right chat the military has rhe lead
responsibili ty for demining wirhin rheir own country. The mines are
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do of chis nature is the individual contacts and bonding, for lack of a
better word, chat occurs between professionals. Whether they're mili-

Ill

::::>
(.)

0

u.

rary professionals o r whether they're doctors rhar are doing an
exchange or academics, ir doesn't marrer. There's a cultural understanding and growth that occurs through rhis program and our o ther
human itarian programs that, in rhe long term, is a huge, huge be nefit.
So rhe individual contacts and mutual understanding that develop are
as valuable as anyth ing else.

NK: \X' har role d o you th ink rhc rnilir.uy can pl.ty in \t.mdarJ , for
d cmin ing rcc.. hno logy?

We have DoD-funded programs rhar can help with that type of thing,
and that's rhe type of partnership that I think really goes a long way ro
rhe mutual benefit of everybody concerned-the United Stares, rhe
partner nation, the NGOs we partner with, rhe United States m il itary,
the partner nation military, and rhe ultimate beneficiary being rhe
mem bers of rhe community that live there. That's where I think we
can make rhe most money and get the most yardage our of rh is program.

N K : Do you think the mili tilfy i' hertl'J 'u itc:d for m ine acrion rha n

LTC C: l rhink rhe roles that we have right now wirh the HDTC
doing the training rhcy do, plus the OSD SO/ LI C [Office of the
Secrctaty of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity
Conflict] research and development folks do absolutely tremendous
work. I wouldn't say it needs to be adjusted. They wi ll go to a country, look ar a particular situation in terms of terrain, weather, where
rhe communities are located-any number of facrors-and they'll
look at ir and say, "You know what might help here is a piece of equipment or some sort of technology rhar could do this." Well whatever ir
is they chink would work best doesn't exist, so rhey will go manufacture that, and rhc:y'll rake it down to this country a nd they'll rest it.
And the Office of the Secretary of Defense fully funds rhar program.
We've gor equipment down in Ho nduras right now that rhey're doing
a final rest on. The benefits to rhe partner nation are absolutely
tremendous, and from a techno logy standpoint, it's those guys who
work om of OSD SO/LI C a t Fort Belvoir, Vi rginia, that bring a huge
amount to the table, whether it's experimenting with unma nned aerial vehicles, wirh ground penetrating radar ro idenrif)t m ines-rhose are
tremendous technological advances that we ca n capitalize o n .
NK: Wh.n d u you rhink is rhe role fil r the mili t.try in m ine ri>k
.:d uc...ll ion .rnd victim assisranc.:?
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LTC C: That's rwo separate questions, so I'd like ro answer each separately. In mine risk education, our role is ro work wirh rhe communities and through the community leaders ro help them develop a
good solid mine risk education program . You know, kids are kids, and
so ofte n, as you know, children are the victims of land mines; people
working in rhe agricultural community are rhe victims of land mines.
Our role is to help the communities in which they live develop srrong
programs char are coherem, rhar receive rhe necessary funding, thar are
we ll enough pur rogether so that they're sustai ned, thereby reducing
the number of landmine victims while rhe demincrs go ahead and ger
an area cleared of mines.
The other question ... that is a great question , and I was
talking to the guys from rhe Polus Ccnrer, because in rhe HMA
Program we really don't have a role in victim assistance. Bur we have
other programs within Southern Command rhat ca n assist wirh that.
We have a humanitarian assistance program. W e have humanitarian
and civic assistance programs. I would see an example of an organ ization like rhe Polus Center working in Leon, Nicaragua, where we've
also worked, primarily after Hurricane Mitch, when Southern
Com mand provided both immed iate and long-term disaster rel ief and
reconsrrucrion ro Central America. In Leon, they have a victim assistance center that need s renovation o r they're trying to build a new o ne.

the h uman itarian s.:cror?

LTC C: I wouldn't say that at all. I wou ld say there are professionals
in the humanitarian sector, and 1 would say there are professionals
in the military. We arc nor at all interested in competing. We're imercsrcd in working together to solve mumal problems rhar affecr the
world community.

The Role of

Military Technical Advisors

N K: T hat was something you ' pok.: about earlier- partnerships
and how im porr.rnr they .rre. I "'1.' wonde ring how you th ink
rhe mil itary can compkm.:nr other o rg,m it.ttiom worki ng in huma nit.lria n dcmining.

LTC C : W hen I was just mentioning the humanitarian assista nce
program, I rhink rhar's a great example. We've partnered wirh anumber of NGOs throughout the region al ready, both international
NGOs, the larger ones, as well as local, community-based civic acrion
groups. Our partnersh ip opportuni ties arc more lim ited by imagination than they are by fu nd ing. Now, we certai nly have some real-world
concerns; we can't, from a military standpoint, say, "O K, let's go do
rhis type of project in this a rea" just because somebod y's asked us ro,
bur there are many, many cases where there is a confluence of interest,
and those need ro be pursued vigorously ro make sure rhar we generate a sort of synergy through the confluence of interest and maximize
all of our capabilities ro achieve whatever particular objective ir may be
ar rhe time-whether it's education, whether it's health, whether it's,
as you mentioned, victim assisrance, rhar's another area rhar parmersh ips are certainly viable.

• Photo c/o MAlC.
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Introduction
In 1989 a multinational contingent of soldiers began to
arrive in Pakistan tO support a humanitarian mine action program for
Afghan refugees. They were, in effect, Technical Advisors (TAs) in rhe
fi eld of humani ta rian mine action, and in rhe years since, military TAs
have participated in m any other programs. This has nor been withom
irs controversial aspects.
For rhe purposes of chis discussion (and acknowledging char
some will not fir rh is description precisely) a military TA is a serving
soldier who is attached ro a humanitarian mine action program in a
training, advisory and memoring capacity. The military TA differs
from visiting military forces in three respects. He or she is nor-or
should nor be- a short-term visiror, bur rather is in theTA position
for a period of six months ro one year. The military TA is nor parr of
a fo rmed military unit, although national contingents within a program are usually under rhe command of their senior representative for
adm inistrative, personnel and disciplinary purposes. Finally, he or she
is nor armed and may nor necessarily wear a uniform.
l must confess a certain bias on my part. I have been a mi litary TA and I am immodest enough ro believe rhat my efforrs were
nor e ntirely in vain. I have also known and worked with many military TAs, from my own country and from others, and while they were
nor all well-suited ro rhe task, I believe rhar most of them did good
work. Somewhat inevitably, therefore, I am going to conclude rhar the
use of military T As is not a bad thing. I have structured rhis discussion
according to what I perceive ro be the three main concerns: ability,
money and philosophy. Or, more simply, can they do the job, how
m uch do they cost and should they be doing it an}'\vay?

by Rohan Maxwell, M ajor, Canadian Army
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